Does the self exist as an item of ontological phenomena independent of the world into which it is born? Or, without the perceivable "world," does the ostensible "self" cease to be empirically defined? Why?

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Michael Luger If the ontology is no reductive materialistic one, it better exists.
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Said Morad Babaheidari It's a very fundamental and interesting question. I'm wondering isn't what you said not the same as the body-soul dualism which has been discussed in more than 3000 years now but still no one has come with any evidence to whether prove or disprove it?
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Gustavo C. Nogueira the ultimate question indeed, alongside the question of its meaning. and I think Heidegger has a great contribution to this problem. to pose the self as that which can be "born into" the world already places the world as that in which "one" always alre...See More
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Tristan Haze Hi thanks guys I think this is abeautful question, I love to ponder it at night when I am thinking about ontology. Descartes once said 'Hey ghuys, I think I'm real! Wait, I know it! OK" and I guess we all been cathching up ever since. Check out the pilos for more info
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Tristan Haze

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